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Abstract
This paper develops a theory in which oligarchic ownership of land or other
natural resources may impede entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector and
may thereby retard structural change and economic development. We show that,
due to oligopsony power of owners in the agricultural labor market, higher own-
ership concentration depresses entrepreneurial investments by landless, credit-
constrained households, whose investment possibilities depend on the income
earned in the primary sector. We discuss historical evidence from Latin Amer-
ica, India, Taiwan and South Korea which supports our theory.
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1 Introduction
Economic development is intimately related to structural change from natural resource-
intensive production like agriculture or mining to manufacturing and capital-intensive
production. This process is typically driven by the emergence of a new entrepreneurial
class which in oligarchic societies challenges the traditional elite of natural resource
owners economically and politically. The relevant individual characteristic which en-
ables agents to become entrepreneur is whether or not they have the means to finance
the cost of setting up a firm. Under credit constraints and in absence of bequests, this
depends on the households’ own income. An immediate implication is that, because
every economy in an early stage of development is dominated by primary goods pro-
duction, the income earned by landless workers or tenants in the primary sector is a
decisive financial determinant of the possibilities to start manufacturing activity.
This paper argues that, for this reason, the ownership concentration of land or other
natural resources plays an important role for entrepreneurship, structural change, and
economic development. According to our analysis, oligopsony power of large landown-
ers in the agricultural labor market depresses the labor income in the primary sector
and thus the entrepreneurial investments of landless, credit-constrained households.
Thus, our main focus is on the adverse eﬀects of economic power of the preindus-
trial elite in early stages of development. We thereby propose a complementary theory
to the recently emphasized adverse eﬀects of political power of landowners which en-
abled them to block institutional reforms conducive to economic development. Galor,
Moav and Vollrath (2009) show that land inequality is negatively related to the point
of time in which human capital promoting institutions are adopted, thereby delaying
economic development. In Falkinger and Grossmann (2005a) we relate the opposition
of the landed elite to mass education to trade; an open trade regime is politically
supported by rich landowners under a comparative advantage for primary goods pro-
duction. These general equilibrium theories advance the hypothesis that the landed
elite in Latin America blocked reforms of the public education system towards mass
education (e.g. Sokoloﬀ and Engerman, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2005). In an
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interesting recent paper, Vollrath (2010) argues that in order to preserve high rents on
land, large landowners also delayed financial development and therefore slowed down
structural change towards manufacturing. Again, land concentration is an obstacle to
political reforms which could be conducive to economic development.
Other contributions focus on the land market. Proto (2007) argues that high land
inequality is associated with a high rental price of land, which in turn reduces the
possibilities of tenant farmers to invest in education. Gall and Masella (2012) show
that powerful elites have an incentive to form a coalition which prevents competitive
land assignment to skilled producers.
This paper focusses on economic (rather than political economy) channels.1 In
economic approaches to inequality and economic development, capital market imper-
fections play a key role. For instance, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that inequality
may be harmful for economic development if credit constraints prevent workers from
investing in human capital. Our analysis abstracts from educational investments. We
rather suggest a new link between credit market imperfections, occupational choice,
and long-run growth patterns, which focuses on the dismal eﬀects of oligopsony power
of landowners on entrepreneurship.2 Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton
(1997) and Piketty (1997) propose models in which individuals with one-period lives
may open up a firm and leave bequests. They show that initial wealth inequality is typ-
ically negatively related to growth due to the disability of poor and credit-constrained
individuals to cover fixed costs of setting up profitable projects. Banerjee and Newman
(1993) consider a case where high wealth inequality may give rise to a poverty trap.3
1This is not to deny that the dynamic interaction between political institutions and the distribution
of resources is of major importance for development processes. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2005) provide an excellent overview on the vast related literature, focussing on institutions like
property rights protection.
2Falkinger and Grossmann (2005b) show that, when landowners possess oligopsony power in the
labor market, they also oppose public investment and other policies which promote productivity in
the manufacturing sector. Contrary to landowners, entrepreneurs support productivity-promoting
reforms. This is in line with Galor and Moav (2006), who argue that educational reform in 19th
century Western Europe was orchestrated by capitalists. This suggests a vicious politico-economic
circle: by impeding business creation and the size of the manufacturing sector, a high oligopsony
power of landowners also hinders the emergence of a bourgeois class so that the pre-industrial elite
remains the dominant political force.
3Our paper is less related to Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997). They assume that all
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More specifically, they argue that a low ratio of wealthy entrepreneurs to workers de-
presses wages of workers so that their bequests are too low to allow their oﬀsprings to
move up to the medium or upper class of the self-employed or entrepreneurs. While
they consider a one-sector economy, our focus is on structural change in a two-sector
model, in which a low ratio of owners to workers in the primary sector depresses labor
income such that the rural labor force is prevented from moving to the manufacturing
sector. In our model, employment in the manufacturing sector requires the creation of
work places by entrepreneurial investment. Individuals live two periods and all poten-
tial entrepreneurs are born without wealth. They thus have to rely on first-period wage
income (rather than on inherited wealth) to invest in entrepreneurship. This implies a
major role for labor market characteristics. We hypothesize that ownership concentra-
tion in the resource-intensive sector determines the means of the landless population
to invest in manufacturing businesses.
Possibly closest to our paper, Ghatak, Morelli and Sjöström (2001) also link oc-
cupational choice to wage determination in a model with imperfect credit markets.
They propose a principal-agent framework with limited liability constraints to focus
on eﬀort choice of workers. Removing credit constraints mitigates entry barriers into
entrepreneurship and reduces inequality. Through aﬀecting the agency problem, how-
ever, this may reduce incentives to work hard and therefore slow down development.
Whereas their model is driven by the "joint presence of incentive problems in the labor
market and imperfections in the credit market" (p. 783; italics original), our model is
driven by the joint presence of oligopsony power of landowners and restricted access to
credit of landless workers who face the choice whether or not to become entrepreneur.
Moreover, our two-sector framework allows us to explicitly focus on structural change
from primary production to manufacturing. We also discuss historical evidence on the
relationship between land concentration, wages and the evolution of the manufacturing
sector.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 illustrates the basic message of the
paper in the static version of the model. Section 3 extends the model to a dynamic
workers are self-employed whereas our focus is on entrepreneurship.
3
overlapping generations model. It characterizes the dynamics of the development of
entrepreneurial activity and structural change towards manufacturing production. Sec-
tion 4 discusses historical evidence. We first outline how oligopsony power in the rural
labor market was historically associated with slow structural change in Latin America
and India. We also document the increasing orientation of peasants towards non-
agricultural enterprises and fast industrial development in Taiwan and South Korea in
the aftermath of successful land reforms initiated in the early 1950s − consistent with
the link between ownership concentration, income levels of landless households, and
structural change suggested by our framework. The last section provides concluding
remarks.
2 Static Version of the Model
We first illustrate the basic mechanisms how oligopsony power of oligarchic landowners
in interaction with credit market imperfections may aﬀect the economic structure, by
employing a static version of our model. We consider a small open economy. There are
two sectors, a primary (−) sector, called “agriculture”, and a manufacturing (−)
sector. Goods markets are perfectly competitive. Consistent with the assumption of a
small open economy, goods prices are exogenous. For simplicity, they are assumed to
be equal to unity.
2.1 Endowments
There are three types of households: First, a "traditional elite", represented by a
discrete number of   1 households, who own some natural resource, hereafter
referred to as "land".4 Second, a large number of households,  , who are endowed
with labor and do not own land. The  landless individuals may work in agricultural
or manufacturing production. For simplicity, suppose that each production worker can
be employed in only one sector. If employed in the −sector, he or she inelastically
4For instance, the traditional oligarchy in 19th century South America mainly consisted of landown-
ers. Some of them made their fortune from mining.
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supplies one unit of labor. In contrast, workers employed in agriculture react elastically
to the oligopsonistic wage setting of landowners. Denoting by  the number of
workers in the −sector, there are
 =  − (1)
workers seeking employment in the agricultural sector. Third, there is an entrepreneur-
ial and landless class of size . Entrepreneurs create work places in the − sector.
In the dynamic version of the model presented below, the number of entrepreneurs,
, will be endogenous, based on a decision of workers whether or not to become
entrepreneur later in life, and there is heterogeneity in entrepreneurial ability. Here we
assume that  is exogenously given and entrepreneurial abilities are identical.
We normalize total land size to be equal to the population size of workers,  . Thus,
we abstract from eﬀects of population density and focus on the ownership concentra-
tion. We measure this concentration by the ratio of workers to owners,  :=  , which
with our normalization equals ownership of land per member of the traditional elite.
It is assumed that the total amount of land is equally distributed among landowners.
2.2 Technology and Market Structure
While goods markets are perfectly competitive, labor and financial markets are not.
2.2.1 Agricultural Sector
Each landowner produces output  in the agricultural (−) sector on his landholding
 according to
 =  ( ) ≡ () (2)
where  is a linearly homogenous function and  is the amount of labor a single
landowner employs; (·) is increasing, strictly concave and fulfills the standard bound-
ary conditions.
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According to (1), the share of individuals seeking employment in the −sector is
 := 

 = 1−

  (3)
Landowners possess oligopsony power. Facing a certain number of people supplying
their labor force according to an increasing labor supply schedule, they exploit this
power by setting a wage rate which is lower than the marginal product of agricultural
labor. The oligopsony power increases with the number of people seeking employment
in the−sector and declines with the number of landowners competing for agricultural
workers. As shown in the appendix, income of an agricultural worker can be written
as
 = (  ); 

  0,

  0 (4)
First, the wedge between the wage rate and the marginal product of agricultural
labor increases if land ownership is concentrated on fewer owners (higher ). From
this, consistent with historical evidence presented in section 4, we obtain   0. If
workers in the −sector were paid their marginal product, we would have  = 0.
Second, a larger share of workers,  , who seek employment in the agricultural sector,
lowers the marginal return to labor. Thus,   0 would also hold if the wage rate
in the −sector was equal to its marginal product. However, under oligopsony power,
also the labor input per worker in the −sector is reduced, additionally depressing
wage income.
As also shown in the appendix, under production function (2), income (profit) of
landowners, , is given by5
 = ( ); 

  0,

  0 (5)
We shall remark that, for the critical property   0, alternative microfounda-
tions of economic power of owners are conceivable. For instance, although we will refer
5( ) would also be increasing in both arguments if agricultural workers were paid their
marginal product.
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to a decrease in  as lower land concentration, a reduction in  may be interpreted
as any land reform which raises income of tenants and reduces profits of owners. For
instance, Besley and Burgess (2000) and Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) ana-
lyze the impact of various land reform measures in post-independence India, including
regulatory improvement of contractual terms of tenants and reduction in power of
(absentee) landlords.
2.2.2 Manufacturing Sector
Entrepreneurs have to incur fixed set up costs in advance of production in order to
create workplaces. A fixed labor requirement ¯ ≥ 0 together with a capital requirement
() creates employment capacity  (which is fully used in equilibrium); (·) is in-
creasing and strictly convex, with (0) = 0. Denoting the wage rate in manufacturing
by  , total set up costs are  ¯+ (). After investment these costs are sunk. Total
employment of workers in the −sector created by the  entrepreneurs is given by
 =  ¯ +, i.e., employment capacity per firm is
 = 

 − ¯ (6)
Under credit constraints, each entrepreneur can at most incur investment costs
which are a fixed multiple of labor income, earned prior to entrepreneurship. With
income , he or she can invest ,  ≥ 1.6  = 1 means that no credit market exists.
Here we assume that  is equal to  , the income of a manufacturing worker. Later, in
the dynamic version of the model in which the number of entrepreneurs is endogenous,
workers live for two periods and can switch from first-period production work in the
−sector or the −sector to entrepreneurial activity in their second period of life.
The higher is , the better developed is the financial market. Also assume that   ¯.
Otherwise, wage income  would not be suﬃcient to cover the costs for the fixed
6See also Bernake and Gertler (1989). The following simple microfoundation heavily draws on
Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). Let  and  denote the interest rate and income, re-
spectively. Suppose an entrepreneur who invests  can defraud the creditors by paying a cost ,
0 ≤   1 + . To do this is not worthwhile if  ≥ (1 + )( − ), which is equivalent to  ≤ ,
 ≡ (1 + )(1 +  − ). Thus, the maximum amount of investment is , where  ≥ 1.
7
labor requirement.
After investing in creating employment capacity , an entrepreneur produces by
using a simple constant returns to scale technology with labor as only input. Manu-
facturing outpt per entrepreneur is given by
 =  (7)
where  is labor input and   0 denotes entrepreneurial ability. Note first that
entrepreneurs would make losses if  would be equal to the marginal product of labor
at the production stage, due to the presence of set up costs and the constant-returns
production technology (7). Therefore,   . Second, it is plausible to focus on the
case where manufacturing wages are not lower than agricultural wages. In sum, we
have  ∈ [(  ) ). In principle, for instance, if workers in the manufacturing
sector have bargaining power, we could have   (  ). We consider this case
in Falkinger and Grossmann (2005b).7 Here, however, we focus on the case that 
equals the wage income in the agricultural sector,  = (  ). For instance, if
manufacturing workers lack bargaining power, they will accept any wage which is not
below the outside option in the agricultural sector and entrepreneurs pay the lowest
one possible. Using (3), we thus have
 = 
µ
1− 

  
¶
 (8)
2.3 Equilibrium
An entrepreneur who is not credit-constrained chooses employment capacity  to max-
imize profit
 = (−  ) −  ¯ − () (9)
7Positive wage income diﬀerentials between manufacturing and agriculture are consistent with
evidence on a positive (real) urban-rural wage gap. For instance, Hatton and Williamson (1992)
provide historical data on the U.S. for the period 1890-1941.
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Assuming an interior solution and using (6), the first-order condition reads
 = − 0
µ
 − ¯
¶
≡ ˆ( ) (10)
Fig. 1 shows in a (   )−diagram the two curves defined by (8) and (10), labelled
the "−curve" and the "ˆ−curve", respectively. The −curve is increasing in 
whereas the ˆ−curve is decreasing in  . Higher land concentration (increase from
0 to 1  0) shifts down the −curve by depressing labor income. In absence of
credit-constraints, this raises the optimal employment capacity and therefore raises
total manufacturing employment,  , in equilibrium; in turn, this lowers agricultural
employment. The reason is that lower wage costs in production induce entrepreneurs
to raise employment capacity. Thus, without credit constraints, stronger oligopsony
power of landowners boosts structural change towards manufacturing.
Now suppose that entrepreneurs, with wage income  , are credit-constrained.
Capacity, , is thus limited to the amount implied by the condition that the means of
finance,  , equal start-up costs. We have
 ¯ +  () =  =⇒  =

³

 − ¯
´
 − ¯ ≡ ˜(
  ) (11)
Fig. 2 shows in a (   )-diagram again the −curve and the curve as defined
by (11), labelled "˜−curve". The latter starts at ˜( ¯ ) = 0. Also the ˜−curve
is increasing in manufacturing employment,  . The reason is that under credit con-
straints higher income,  , enables entrepreneurs to create more workplaces. Since
higher manufacturing employment, in turn, goes hand in hand with higher wage costs
in production, there may be multiple equilibria, i.e., multiple intersection points be-
tween both curves in Fig. 2. As the −curve starts above the ˜−curve, an equilibrium
exists and is unique, if the ˜−curve is steeper than the −curve. This is the case shown
in Fig. 2. Higher land concentration (increase from 0 to 1  0) again shifts down
the −curve by depressing wage income. This tightens credit constraints and there-
fore, in contrast to the case without binding credit constraints, reduces manufacturing
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employment. The opposite holds if  increases, which shifts the ˜−curve downwards.
For suﬃciently high , credit constraint (11) is no longer binding and the equilibrium
is determined by the curves shown in Fig. 1.
In sum, the simple model suggests that higher land concentration promotes struc-
tural change under advanced credit markets and retards change if credit-constraints
are severe.
3 Dynamic Model
In the present framework, entrepreneurial activity is a decisive determinant for the size
of the manufacturing (relative to the primary) sector. We associate development of an
economy with an increase in manufacturing employment (and, consequently, a decrease
in agricultural employment) over time,  .8 For studying economic development we
therefore have to determine the emergence of entrepreneurial activity endogenously.
We do this by extending the static model considered in section 2 to an overlapping
generations economy with two periods of life, where individuals may diﬀer in entrepre-
neurial ability.
The dynamics come from the decision of individuals who are workers in their first
period of life to switch to entrepreneurship in the second period. This decision de-
pends on the labor market income earned in the first period and on an individual’s
entrepreneurial ability. Everything else is like in the static model.
We implicitly rule out that landowners adopt an entrepreneurial role in manufac-
turing. If landowners could choose to give up their estate and become entrepreneur
in the manufacturing sector, the question is in which sector their profits are higher.
As will become apparent, in equilibrium, the total derivative of profit per landowner
 with respect to ownership concentration  is positive. Thus, landowners will not
find it attractive to become entrepreneur if  is suﬃciently high. This is supported
by historical evidence. Consistent with our analysis, Young (1995) finds that savings
8According to (4) and (8), an increase in  raises wage income. In Falkinger and Grossmann
(2005b), we also link entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector to productivity.
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from previous wage employment was the main source of start-up capital for micro-scale
enterprises in rural Scotland between 1840 and 1914. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) point
out that in early stages of development the rich were typically landowners who did not
engage in business outside the primary sector. According to Crouzet (1985), in the UK
about half of the founders of large industrial undertakings during the first industrial
wave (1750-1850) came from the working class or lower middle class. Some of them,
or their fathers, were employed in the agricultural or mining sector. However, only 3
percent of entrepreneurs were part of the upper class (landowners or oﬃcers) and less
than 10 percent of entrepreneurs were descendants of a landowner family. For instance,
“after 1815, [landowners] did not make any serious contribution either to the cotton
industry or to the great expansion of the iron industry which took place in the 1830s”
(Crouzet, 1985, p. 77).9
3.1 Time Structure
The number of landowner households and the total size of land are time-invariant.
Thus, also the ownership concentration, , is time-invariant. In each period, a landowner
household consists of parent and child, where the child becomes parent in the second
period of life and inherits the land estate. The rents from the fixed factor are shared
within a household of the traditional elite between parent and child.
In each period, a large number of landless workers,  , is born. They are identically
endowed with raw labor in the first period of life. Individuals may save in the first
period of life for old age. Consistent with the open economy assumption the interest
rate is exogenous and set to zero for notational simplicity. Therefore, individual savings
decisions have no general equilibrium eﬀects and play no role in our analysis.
Each individual may become entrepreneur in the manufacturing sector in the second
period of life. When not becoming entrepreneur, individuals retire in the second period
9Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) explain such patterns in a model where altruistic parents can invest
in the patience capital (time preference) of their children and credit constraints give rise to a comple-
mentarity between investment in patience and a steep income profile. Employing this or alternative
microfoundations of the negligible role of landowners in industrial development would not aﬀect our
main results.
11
of life. The cumulative distribution function of entrepreneural ability is time-invariant.
It is denoted by () and has support [0 ¯], ¯  0. Let  denote the number of
entrepreneurs in period , where 0  0 is given. We assume that there is no disutility
of work for entrepreneurs. As second-period labor income is zero for those who do not
choose to become entrepreneur, individuals enter the market as entrepreneurs if net
profits are non-negative.10
An individual who decides to become entrepreneur uses first-period labor income,
−1, to finance setting up a firm. The total set up costs of an entrepreneur  in period
− 1 who creates employment capacity  is given by
( −1) := −1¯ + () (12)
An individual with first-period income −1 can maximally incur set up costs −1,
 ≥ 1, in order to produce in .
3.2 Individual Choices
We compare the cases of non-binding and binding credit constraints by first examining
the investment choice of entrepreneurs and then the decision of workers whether or not
to become entrepreneur in their second period of life.
An entrepreneur  with ability  and first-period income −1 chooses optimal
employment capacity (i.e., firm size)  to maximize net profits, . As output (and
revenue) of entrepreneur  in  is  = , the profit maximization problem reads as
max

 = ( −  ) − ( −1) s.t. (13)
−1 ≥ ( −1) = −1¯ + () (14)
10For instance, see Grossmann (2009) for an overlapping-generations model with entrepreneurs, free
entry, and R&D-based growth.
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3.2.1 Non-Binding Credit Constraints
Suppose first that no entrepreneur is credit-constrained. An unconstrained entrepre-
neur (i.e., (14) is not binding) chooses employment capacity according to first-order
condition  −  = 0 ( ), i.e.,
 = (0)−1
¡ −  ¢ ≡ ˆ () (15)
The resulting profit is given by11
 = ( −  )ˆ ()− (ˆ ())− −1¯ ≡ ˆ () (16)
More able entrepreneurs want to create larger firms, dˆ
d  0.12 Moreover, it is easy to
see that ˆ() is increasing in ability  (applying the envelope theorem) and decreasing
in manufacturing wages in the current and previous period. Define ˆ as being given
by ˆ (ˆ) = 0. Since entry is profitable as long as  ≥ 0, all individuals with ability
above threshold ability level ˆ enter. The following properties hold.
Lemma 1. ˆ is increasing in  and, if ¯  0, in −1; ˆ is independent of .
Proof. Immediately follows from (15) and (16).
The fraction of entrepreneurs in period  is
 := 

 = 1−(ˆ) (17)
The fraction of production labor employed in the −sector in  is R ¯ˆ ˆ()d().
The start-up labor requirement (¯) in  is employed by the fraction of entrepreneurs
+1 = 1 − (ˆ+1) active in  + 1. Consequently, the total fraction of agricultural
11For notational simplicity, wage rates are supressed in functions ˆ and ˆ .
12Thus, the firm size distribution primarily depends on the distribution of entrepreneurial ability
(). To match the observed firm size distribution is beyond the scope of the paper. It would require
to specify () and allow for the “mixed” case where some entrepreneurs (with high ability) are credit
constrained and others are not.
13
workers in period ,  = 1−  ,13 is
 = 1−
£
1−(ˆ+1)
¤ ¯ − ¯Z
ˆ
ˆ ()d() ≡ ˆ  (18)
Lemma 2. ˆ is increasing in  and, if ¯  0, also in −1 and +1; ˆ is
independent of .
Proof. Use (15), (18) and Lemma 1.
For ¯  0, if −1 increases, less entrepreneurs are active in period  (i.e., ˆ is
higher) because ex ante labor costs for the start-up labor requirement (¯) rise. When
credit constraints are non-binding, this raises the agricultural labor share in . If +1
is higher, less entrepreneurs are active in period +1 (i.e., ˆ+1 is higher) because they
anticipate higher marginal costs in  + 1. If ¯  0, this lowers manufacturing labor
demand in . If  is higher, less capacity will be installed by entrepreneurs who are
active in period , according to (15); this raises ˆ. Moreover, if ¯  0, costs of entry
in order to be active in + 1 rise; this raises ˆ+1. Both eﬀects reduce manufacturing
employment in  and therefore raise the fraction of agricultural workers in .
3.2.2 Binding Credit Constraints
Now suppose that all entrepreneurs are credit-constrained. If credit-constrained, en-
trepreneur  with first-period income −1 in period − 1 chooses capacity   ˆ()
which results when constraint (14) is binding. In this case, we have
 = −1(−1 − −1¯) (19)
Thus, when credit constraints are binding, higher first-period income and more ad-
vanced credit markets (higher ) allow to create larger firms. The resulting profit
is
 = ( −  )−1(−1 − −1¯)− −1 ≡ Π(−1 ) (20)
13Recall that  denotes the total number of workers in the −sector.
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Lemma 3. Π is increasing in both  −1 and .
Proof. According to (20), Π

−1 =
(− )0() −   0 if and only if  −  0(ˆ

 ).
Recall from (15) that, when credit constraints are non-binding, the optimal capacity
is given by  −  = 0(ˆ ). When an entrepreneur is credit-constrained, he chooses
  ˆ ; in this case,  −   0 ( ). In a similar fashion, we can show Π

  0.
The profit in  of a constrained entrepreneur is increasing in the means of finance,
−1, because employment capacity is suboptimally low and, according to (19), also
increasing in −1. This explains Lemma 3.
3.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
We now derive the macroeconomic equilibrium. In order to avoid cumbersome case dis-
tinctions and to emphasize the impact of oligopsony power of landowners for economic
development through the interaction between land concentration and credit market
imperfections in its sharpest relief, we focus on the polar cases where either no or all
entrepreneurs are credit-constrained.
Recall that wage income is the same in both sectors, i.e.,
 =  = (  ) for all . (21)
Thus, wage income is determined by oligopolistic landowners in the −sector which
take  (the fraction of workers supplying labor to the agricultural sector) as given.
3.3.1 Non-Binding Credit Constraints
According to Lemma 1, threshold ability level ˆ is a function of  and, if ¯  0, also of
−1. Recalling this and substituting ˆ and ˆ+1 into (18) and using  = (  ),
we can write  = (  +1 −1 ). According to (4) and Lemma 2, function 
is decreasing in  and ; if ¯  0,  also depends negatively on +1 and −1. The
steady state solution of the agricultural labor share solves ¯ = (¯  ¯  ¯  ).
Proposition 1. Suppose that credit constraints are non-binding. If ¯ = 0, there
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are no transitional dynamics and the long run agricultural labor share, ¯, is unique.
If ¯  0, the agricultural labor share ( ) is governed by a second-order diﬀerence
equation. ¯ is decreasing in land concentration ( ).
Proof. Uniqueness of a steady state holds because the right-and side of ¯ =
(¯  ¯  ¯  ) is decreasing in ¯ . To prove the comparative-static result, recall
that  is decreasing in  and apply the implicit function theorem.
The main insight of Proposition 1 is simple. Without credit-constraints, entre-
preneurs in the −sector create more workplaces when marginal wage cost at the
production stage ( ) is lower. As  =  , this wage cost is decreasing in land con-
centration (), because more oligopsony power of landowners in the −sector aﬀects
the wage to be paid by entrepreneurs. In absence of credit constraints, this mechanism
parallels the static version of the model in section 2, where the number of entrepre-
neurs was exogenous (Fig. 1). In the dynamic model, there is an additional eﬀect
of an increase in : the increase in profits resulting from a lower  also encourages
entrepreneurship. In sum, an increase in  promotes development in absence of credit
constraints. Moreover, if ¯  0, there are transitional dynamics.14
3.3.2 Binding Credit Constraints
If credit-constraints are binding, according to (19) and (21), the chosen employment
capacity of entrepreneur  is given by
 = −1(( − ¯)(−1 )) ≡ ˜(−1  ) (22)
Lemma 4. ˜ ≡ ˜(−1  ) is increasing in  and decreasing in both −1 and .
Proof. The eﬀect of a change in  is straightforward, as 0  0. For the other
results, use   0 and   0 from (4).
Credit-constrained entrepreneurs, whose investments depend on their first-period
14Characterizing the dynamics from the second-order diﬀerence which results when ¯  0 would
require strong assumptions on functional forms.
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wage income set by oligopolistic landowners, create less employment capacity for period
 if the agricultural labor share in period − 1 (−1) is higher or if land concentration
() is higher. The opposite holds if the credit market is more advanced (higher ).
For profits of entrepreneurs we have:
 = ( − (  ))˜(−1  )− (−1 ) ≡ ˜ () (23)
Given marginal wage costs in period ,  =  ,  is decreasing in  through the
eﬀect on −1 = (−1 ) (recall   0 from (4) and observe (22)). However, there
is a second, counteracting eﬀect on profits. An increase in  also lowers wage costs
per production worker. For entrepreneurs active in , these are given by  . Through
this eﬀect, profits  are increasing in . Hence, the total eﬀect of an increase in 
on entrepreneurial profits is ambiguous. By contrast, because an increase in  raises
employment capacity  = ˜(−1  ), according to Lemma 4,  increases when
credit markets become more advanced.
Define threshold ability level ˜ ≡ ˜(  −1  ) as being given by ˜ (˜) = 0.
The following results are immediate.
Lemma 5. ˜ is decreasing in both  and ; if ¯ = 0, ˜ is increasing in −1;
the impact of an increase in  on ˜ is ambiguous.
Proof. Results with respect to a change in  and  follow from the definition of ˜
and the preceding discussion. An increase in the current agricultural labor share 
lowers marginal wage costs  (recall from (4) that   0) and therefore raises .
This explains why ˜ is decreasing in  . From (20) and Lemma 3, when ¯ = 0,  is
increasing in −1 = (−1 ). Thus, ˜ is increasing in −1.
In period , the fraction of manufacturing production labor is (1 − (˜))˜ . The
fraction of entrepreneurs active in period  + 1, each with labor requirement ¯ in , is
given by
+1 = 1−(˜(+1    )) ≡ ˜(+1    ) (24)
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Thus, the agricultural labor share in  is given by
 = 1− ˜(+1    )¯ − (1−(˜(  −1  )))˜(−1  ) (25)
Again denote the steady state level of the agricultural labor share by ¯ .
Proposition 2. Suppose that credit constraints are binding.
(a) For ¯ = 0, the following holds. (i) The agricultural labor share () follows a
first-order diﬀerence equation; (ii) Let ¯ be a stable steady state. For initial condition
0  ¯ in the local environment of ¯, the agricultural labor share gradually declines
over time in the transition to the steady state. (iii) More advanced financial markets
(higher ) lead to a decrease in a stable steady state agricultural labor share ( ¯)
whereas a more concentrated ownership of land (higher ) has an ambiguous eﬀect on
¯.
(b) For ¯  0,  follows a second-order diﬀerence equation and an increase in 
has an ambiguous eﬀect on it.
Proof. We start with (a). For ¯ = 0, according to (24) and Lemma 4 and 5, the
right-hand side of (25) is decreasing in  and increasing in −1. This confirms part (i)
and (ii) of Proposition 2 (a), respectively. In an analogous way, the comparative-static
results in part (iii) of Proposition 2 (a) as well as the proof of Proposition 2 (b) also
follow from (24), (25) and Lemma 4 and 5.
Like in the static version of the model in section 2, where the number of entre-
preneurs was exogenous, a more concentrated landownership depresses employment
creation per entrepreneur. Nevertheless, in contrast to Fig. 2 in the static model, a
higher  does not have an unambiguously negative eﬀect on economic development.
This is because an increase in  may foster entrepreneurship, unlike in section 2, where
this possibility was ruled out. As discussed above, the reason is that when landown-
ers possess stronger oligopsony power, entrepreneurs face lower marginal wage costs in
manufacturing production.15 When ¯  0, also fixed costs of employment creation are
15If workers in the manufacturing sector have bargaining power and   (  ), then this eﬀect
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reduced, which may aﬀect the evolution of the economy.
4 Discussion of Historical Evidence
This section discusses historical evidence for Latin America, India, Taiwan and South
Korea, supporting the mechanisms proposed by our theory: that oligopsony power
associated with a high concentration of landholdings depresses income of peasants.
In interaction with credit constraints, this possibly impedes employment creation of
entrepreneurs and possibly also entrepreneurship outside the agricultural sector.
4.1 Latin America
The strong concentration of landholdings in Latin America has been widely documented
in the literature (e.g. McBride 1936; Mosk, 1951; Barraclough, 1970; Clark, 1971; Katz,
1974; Morse, 1975; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). Apart from its implication on political
outcomes, an important economic result of the oligarchic ownership structure was a
substantial degree of power of large landowners in the labor market for rural work
and over tenants. Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995; p. 2678) conclude that “a
major purpose of the huge landholdings was to restrict the indigenous population’s
possibilities for independent cultivation”. Peasants were typically allowed to cultivate
a small piece of land on the farm of owners of haciendas or landlord estates for own
subsistence in exchange for labor services, for which they might not even receive a wage
payment. Clearly as a result of oligopsony power of owners, these “share tenants do
not receive their full marginal product” (Binswanger, Deininger and Feder, 1995; p.
2670).
Regional oligopsony power was also secured by restrictions on peasant mobility
through vagrancy laws or debt peonage.16 Vagrancy laws were introduced 1825 in El
vanishes and an increase in land concentration  unambigously impedes development (see Falkinger
and Grossmann, 2005b, on such alternative specification of wage formation in manufacturing.
16The poor village and smallholder population accepted to work on the plantations in return to
cash advances and had to stay until the debt was paid oﬀ. Debt repayment was diﬃcult, however.
Employers operated company stores where goods were sold at inflated prices. This contributed to a
stagnation of real wages for many decades. After death, the duty to repay debt was passed on to
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Salavador and 1877 in Mexico.17 In Guatemala vagrancy laws replaced debt peonage
in 1934 (abandoned in response to international pressure), implying that someone with
little or no land had to work at least 150 days per year on a coﬀee plantation. From
the perspective of a large landowner, such legal measures kept the elasticity of labor
supply low and thereby enhanced oligopsony power. As a result, the real wage rate for
agricultural labor was extremely low. For instance, in Guatemala it showed no upward
trend in the century prior to the revolution in 1944 (Schweigert, 2004, Tab. 5). Still
in the 1960s, average annual per capita peasant incomes in Brazil, Chile, Columbia,
Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru were just about USD 40-100 (Barraclough, 1970).
Despite revolts and revolutions, triggered by the dramatic concentration of land-
holdings in Latin America and the resulting situation of most peasants, land reforms
have mostly been unsuccessful. As a notable exception, Mexico implemented an even-
tually successful land reform, starting in 1917. It was confiscatory for land in excess of
100 hectares. Total compensation to landowners was a mere fraction of 0.5 percent of
expropriated land (Flores, 1970).18 In line with our prediction that less concentrated
land ownership is conducive for investments of initially landless households outside the
primary sector, Flores (1970, p. 904) concludes that “there is no doubt that high rates
of capital formation for Mexico’s industrial revolution in the early stages of the reform,
1917-42, came from agriculture”.
Overall, however, the oligarchic ownership of land in Latin America resulted in a
slow-growing manufacturing sector.19 Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
industrial development was in fact negligible.20 During the first half of the twentieth
children. (See Katz, 1974, and Bulmer-Thomas, 1994, ch. 4.)
17See Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995, Tab. 42.1, Appendix 1) for a systematic account of
legal measures to “surplus extraction” to the favor of large landowners in many parts of the world.
18In contrast, the envisaged large-scale land reform in Venezuela, which began in 1958, was impeded
due to high costs of the government, which aimed to compensate landowners according to the market
value of land.
19Consistent with our assumptions, labor was the main input in current manufacturing production
and, in contrast to the agricultural or mining sector, typically decently remunerated (see Bulmer-
Thomas, 1994, p. 121).
20Unsurprisingly, also urbanization was much slower than in the United States. In Argentina, Chile,
Mexico and Uruguay, for instance, the fraction of the national population living in the largest cities
basically stagnated in the entire nineteenth century (e.g., around 10 percent in Mexico). In the U.S.
the population share residing in towns of 8000 or more inhabitants gradually rose from 4.9 percent in
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century the situation eventually improved, although manufacturing development still
lagged considerably behind most regions of North America.21 Manufacturing output
as share of GDP in 1913 was 16.6 percent in Argentina and 14.5 percent in Chile
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1994, Tab. 5.3). In Brazil in 1920 it was 12.1 percent, but only 3
percent of the labor force was employed in modern manufacturing. Mexico, with 12.3
percent in 1910 had a comparable manufacturing share, whereas that of Columbia was
just 6.7 percent in 1925. For instance, the share of employment in the agricultural
sector was basically stable between 1880-1930 in Brazil at circa 2/3, whereas it sharply
declined in the United States and Canada from around 50 percent to 22 and 31 percent,
respectively.22
4.2 India
In India, during the British empire many small peasants lost their land and became
wage workers in the agricultural sector (Patnaik, 1983). Land concentration was par-
ticularly high in areas where the British introduced landlord-based revenue systems
for collecting land taxes. In these areas, single landlords were free to collect taxes
from peasants to fulfil the revenue liability of a village, whereas in other areas revenue
settlement was directly made with individual cultivators or village bodies which jointly
owned the village (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). Similarly to many parts of Latin America,
wage negotiations were infrequent and agricultural workers were often tied to landlords
by debt peonage. Roy (2005) provides evidence that, as a result, the average real wage
for agricultural labor in colonial India showed no upward trend from the 1870s until the
end of the British empire. In contrast, real wages in urban areas increased significantly.
1810 to 33 percent in 1900 (Morse, 1975, pp. 5-9).
21Diﬀerences in land concentration may also explain diﬀerences in regional development within the
US. Braunhaut (1949) and Wright (1987, Fig. 1) provide historical data for US farm labor wage
rates for the time periods 1909-1948 and 1866-1942, respectively. Consistent with oligopsony power of
large landowners, they find substantial and persistent regional wage diﬀerentials between the South
− which was characterized by large plantations − and the rest of the country. Braunhaut (1949, p.
189) attributes these wage diﬀerences to “the fact that agricultural workers have largely remained
unorganized [...] [and] virtually without bargaining power, particularly in the instances where farms
are being operated on a commercial basis by absentee owners”.
22See the data provided by Peter Lindert under www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/.
21
Rosenzweig (1978) exploited the regional variation of land inequality in India to
examine how labor market outcomes depend on land concentration among owners,
employing data from a household survey in 1960-61 from 159 Indian districts. He
shows that higher land concentration (measured by the Kuznets ratio of landholding
inequality) has a strong negative impact on agricultural wages. In line with our model
based on labor market power of large owners, he concludes that this finding “may
partly reflect the monopsonistic restrictions on wages and employment by relatively
large landowners” (Rosenzweig, 1978, p. 860).
More recently, Besley and Burgess (2000) analyze panel data for 16 Indian states,
1958-92, on the impact of land reform measures. They find that particularly those re-
forms raised agricultural wages and reduced poverty, which improved the conditions of
tenancy contracts, reduced power of absentee landowners and abolished intermediaries
which collected land revenues increased income of tenants.23 Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
find that, nevertheless, the historical institution of a landlord-based revenue system
had long-lasting eﬀects (still in the period 1960-85) on education spending, agricul-
tural investments and agricultural productivity which cannot alone be explained by
high land concentration. They do not look at agricultural wages and development of
the manufacturing sector, however. In any case, institutions could matter over and
above economic power of landlords which results from high land concentration. We
see both approaches as complementary. Future research may attempt a comparative
analysis of various theories on the eﬀects of land concentration and land institutions
on the non-agricultural sector, which we lack at the moment.
4.3 Taiwan and South Korea
There is still a controversy about the determinants of the remarkable pace of devel-
opment in Taiwan and South Korea after independence from Japanese colonial rule.
23The evidence by Besley and Burgess (2000) also suggests that land reforms in India after 1958
had no eﬀect on agricultural output, whereas Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) show that tenancy
reform in West Bengal in 1977, which to some degree assigned property rights to tenants, substantially
raised agricultural productivity. The earlier literature on the eﬀects of land concentration and land
reforms on the performance of the agricultural sector is surveyed by Binswanger, Deininger and Feder
(1995).
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For instance, Rodrik (1995) challenges the widespread belief that the ‘East-Asian mir-
acle’ can mainly be explained by the governments’ trade policy. He rather points to
possible eﬀects of the unusually successful land reforms and a negative relationship
between rates of economic growth and land inequality (rather than income inequality)
in cross-country data.
Our paper may contribute to this debate by proposing an economic mechanism
for beneficial eﬀects of land redistribution. In Taiwan, during the Qing’s dynasty
rule (1683-1895), land concentration was greatly enhanced when individuals or land
companies purchased land from the government or from aborigines. Smallholders saw
little change in real income during Japanese rule and were largely dependent on wage
income, whereas the value of land increased quickly. At the end of World War II, after
Taiwan was transferred to China, the Nationalist government confiscated Japanese
property and, with American help, initiated a major land reform in three steps between
1949-53. First, public land was sold to tenants at a fairly low price (equal to 2.5 times
annual yield of the main crop). Second, the rent tenants had to pay to landowners was
limited to a maximum of 37.5 percent of normal harvest value, down from typically
over 50 percent. Third, and maybe most important, landowners had to sell land in
excess of 3 hectares to the government, which resold it to tenants. An estimated 37
percent of cultivated land was redistributed under the program and farm incomes rose
dramatically, by 230 percent to 1968 (Minns and Tierney, 2003). In line with our
theory, Minns and Tierney (2003) argue that this “created the basis for a large number
of small entrepreneurs [...] to develop manufacturing businesses. [. . . ] Non-farm income
for rural households was already 79 percent of their total household income in 1966,
rising to 89 percent a decade later”. Per capita income grew by almost 6 percent in
the three decades after land reform and productivity growth accounted for about 2/3
of total growth. Between 1945 and 1972, the agricultural labor share fell from 2/3 to
1/3 (Oshima, 1986). Consistent with our model, growth in manufacturing was driven
by small enterprises. In 1961, 99.1 percent of manufacturing businesses had less than
100 employees. The average size was 8, increasing to 28 until 1971 (Mao and Schive,
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1995).24 Many small enterprises were located in rural areas.
In Korea, during the 19th century a powerful class of landowners emerged and real
wages (in terms of rice) were falling, only slightly rebounding in the first half of the 20th
century. Due to the fear that tenants would shift towards communism, the U.S. military
administration pressed towards land reform, which started 1950 (Agricultural Land
Reform Amendment Act). Similar to Taiwan, it enforced a cap on landholding of about
3 hectares. Moreover, farms had to be owner-managed or —cultivated. The government
also bought land at low prices and sold it to tenants, who largely made payments
in rice (Jeon and Kim, 2000).25 Compared to the colonial period, rice wages almost
tripled until the end of the 1960s (Cha and Wu, 2002, Fig. 7). Like Taiwan, South
Korea saw quick emergence of small manufacturing enterprises. This is remarkable as
political and economic support mostly focussed on big firms in the 1950s.26 The timing
of the emergence of small businesses (despite suﬀering from the Korean war 1950-53)
is consistent with the eﬀects of a land redistribution predicted by our model.27
5 Concluding Remarks
While land and other natural resources are key factors in primary goods production,
development and structural change are driven by capital investments into manufactur-
ing firms. The level of such investments depends on the number of individuals who have
both an economic interest in and the economic means for entrepreneurial activities. In
24In the 1950s growth was particularly fast in food-processing and textile industries. Later, indus-
tries in electronics and metal products evolved.
25Half of the land was already sold prior to 1950 in anticipation of land reform. Landowners were
basically forced to these transactions due to personal security threats after the end of Japanese rule.
This was also the reason for the weak resistance of owners to land reform.
26These were mostly former Japanese large scale industrial facilities established before 1940. The
115 biggest firms produced 33 % of manufacturing output in 1958 (Regnier, 1993, Tab. III). Later on,
government support shifted more and more to smaller firms as their important role was increasingly
recognized.
27The salient role of small businesses in early stages of development is well documented also for
today’s transition countries. In their survey, McMillan and Woodruﬀ (2002, p. 166) stress: “New
firms have usually been the fastest growing segment in transition economies”. For instance, about
one-sixth of industrial workers in Poland in 1994 were employed in start up firms. In Estonia, start-
ups created almost all new jobs between 1989-94 and more than half of the new jobs in Bulgaria and
Romania.
24
early stages of development, characterized by a substantial size of the primary sector,
the means must be earned in the primary sector. How much of the income from pri-
mary goods production is left for entrepreneurial investment depends on the rents kept
by landowners. These rents depend on the ownership concentration of landholdings
and on the size of the labor force supplied to the primary sector.
Based on this line of reasoning, the model proposed in this paper suggests that an
oligarchic land ownership may be a major obstacle to entrepreneurship and structural
change. The key mechanism for this result is the interaction of oligopsony power of
landowners in the rural labor market and imperfect credit markets. Higher concentra-
tion of landownership depresses wage income of potential entrepreneurs and therefore
limits entrepreneurial investment into employment capacity. In general, however, there
is also a counteracting eﬀect. If higher ownership concentration in the primary sector
suﬃciently reduces wage costs of entrepreneurs, then more workers may choose to open
up a firm under free entry, despite reduced employment creation per entrepreneur.
An adverse role of ownership concentration of landholdings for oligopsony power
of landowners in the rural labor market is supported by evidence from Latin America,
India, Taiwan and South Korea. Moreover, the emergence of small manufacturing
businesses in Taiwan and South Korea immediately in the aftermath of land reform
suggests that a more equal land distribution plays an important role for promoting
economic development apart from politically determined factors like the provision of
education. An interesting task for future research may be to examine the role of the
ownership structure in the gold-, oil-, uranium-, tin- or diamond-industry for the poor
development of African countries within our framework.
Appendix
This appendix provides a microfoundation for the properties of income of workers in
the −sector,  , and of landowners, , as hypothesized in (4) and (5), respectively.
We assume that landowners have oligopsony power.
Let  be the wage rate and  = () be individual labor supply of a worker
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in the −sector. If total employment capacity installed by entrepreneurs is given by
 , landowners face labor supply schedule  = (), where  =  −  .
Suppose for simplicity that individual labor supply takes the isoelastic form () =
1,   0, so that the inverse labor supply function in the−sector is given by  =
(). Observing this schedule, owners simultaneously choose labor demand ()
to maximize profits  =  ()−, taking the hiring of others as given. Then,
since employers are identical, in Nash equilibrium we have  =  and the wage
rate follows the standard oligopsony formula:
 = 
0()
1 +   (26)
Thus, wages in the−sector are below their marginal product. Individual wage income
in the −sector is given by  =  ().
We first show that, in equilibrium,  is decreasing in both  and , which implies

  0 and   0, respectively. Combining  =  with  =  we have
 = . From this, using  =  and  = , we obtain  =  .
Hence, using () = 1 and  = , (26) can be rewritten as:
 0
³
() 1
´
=
µ
1 +


¶
  (27)
This implicitly defines the equilibrium wage rate in the primary sector, ˜(  ),
as function of  and . Observing  00  0, we find ˜  0 and ˜  0. Thus,
equilibrium income
 = ˜(  )(˜(  )) ≡ ˜(  ) (28)
has the properties as claimed in (4). For later use, from (27) it is also easy to show
that
1

˜


 + 1 =
 0
 0 − () 1 00  0 (29)
We next consider the profit of a landowner, given by  = ()− . Using
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 =  , () = 1 and  = ˜(  ), we can write equilibrium profit per
owner as
 = 
h

³
(˜(  )) 1
´
− (˜(  )) 1+1
i
≡ (  ) (30)
Hence,

 = 
∙
 0
³
() 1
´µ1
(
)
1
−1˜ 
 + () 1
¶
−µ
1
 + 1
¶
() 1 ˜

 
 − () 1+1
¸
 (31)
Substitute (27) into (31) to obtain

 = (
)
1
+1
∙ 

µ
1

˜


 + 1
¶
− ˜




¸
 (32)
Using ˜  0 and (29), we find   0. In an analogous way, (30) implies

 =

 + (
)
1

µ
1
 − 1
¶ ˜
 
  0 (33)
(Recall  =  ,   1 and ˜  0.) This confirms (5).
Finally, we address the claims in the main text for the case where the wage rate
in the −sector is equal to its marginal product; that is, landowners’ labor demand,
, is implicitly defined by  0 () =  as a function ˜(  ) with ˜  0 and
˜
 =

 . Using this in the labor market clearing condition  ˜(  ) = () 1 ,
we get the following implicit characterization for the equilibrium wage for agricultural
labor:
˜(  )− () 1  = 0 (34)
(recall that individual labor supply is () = 1). This defines  = ˜(  ) in
the competitive equilibrium. It is straightforward to show that ˜  0 and ˜ = 0.
(Use ˜  0 and ˜ =  .) Thus, as claimed in the main text,   0 and  = 0.
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Moreover, with  = ˜(  ), an owner’s profit equals
 = 
Ã
˜(˜(  ) )

!
− ˜(  )˜(˜(  ) ) (35)
where  = ˜(  ). Diﬀerentiation with respect to  yields:  = −˜ ˜  0,
where the envelope property has been used. In an analogous way, diﬀerentiation with
respect to  yields:  = ( ˜ )− ˜  0( ˜ )− ˜ ˜. Using ˜ = 0 together with the
fact that   ˜  0 for a standard production function  also confirms   0.
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Figure 1. Increase in ownership concentration from 0z  to 01 zz >  in absence of 
credit constraints.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Increase in ownership concentration from 0z  to 01 zz >  with binding 
credit constraints.  
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